Mass Immigration as a Threat to Civil Liberties

Lobograph

The German journalist Sascha Lobo looks (g) at all the fatal terror attacks in Europe between 2014 and 2017 using a very restrictive definition and finds that all of them were Islamist in nature. But even more telling, all 24 of the attackers were known to the authorities as being violent and/or radicalized. Some were even under surveillance. (See above graph).

Naturally, he attaches some relevant caveats: we don't know exactly how many attacks were thwarted, security agencies are overburdened, it's nearly impossible to determine which potential attackers will follow through on threats and which won't.

But German and French politicians have used the threat of terror attacks to pass legislation that reduces civil liberties for everyone. The French state of emergency seems to go on indefinitely, and Amnesty is complaining about the severe restrictions it places on the right to protest. Germany is passing or trying to pass laws to allow government spy viruses, more video surveillance, and the storage of telecommunications data of every single German. Lobo notes:

I'm still not sure why saving the data of my telephone conversations with my wife is supposed to help fight terror, when attacks are almost always carried out by Islamists who are already known to law enforcement. I'm still not sure why my fundamental rights should be attacked and undermined, when someone like Anis Amri can move about freely gathering weapons and talking excitedly about terror attacks, as the authorities were fully aware.

Once again, this point was made almost a decade ago in Christopher Caldwell's book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. As he says on page 11, a major theme of the book is that European responses to the problems caused by mass Muslim immigration often result in the erosion of freedom of all Europeans: "immigration exacts a steep price in freedom".

A few examples:

  • Singling out Muslims for eavesdropping would seem like racial profiling, so the "path of least constitutional resistance" (as Caldwell puts it) is to pass laws allowing eavesdropping on everyone.
  • In Sweden, a cabinet minister proposed that all young female children be checked for genital mutilation, even though this practice is limited almost exclusively to Somali immigrants.
  • Practically the only remaining supporters of blasphemy laws are Muslims who want to be able to use them against people who ridicule Mohammed.
  • Everyone who wants to visit a synagogue in Europe must pass through security checkpoints, even though the threat to Jews and Jewish institutions comes overwhelmingly from Muslims. I couldn't get into a single French synagogue when I last visited Paris because there weren't enough staff to monitor visitors.
  • Cities all over Germany are installing surveillance cameras and passing alcohol bans in certain public gathering-places which have become scenes of frequent dust-ups between young men. 90% of these fights are between immigrants. But everyone, including law-abiding Europeans, is now denied the chance to enjoy a frosty one while sitting on a bench in the town square, watching the sun go down. Another one of life's little pleasures circles the drain.

The list goes on and on. Much of the quality of life of Europe is built on social trust and shared values, implicit social agreements which never needed be written down. This fact also made it easy for Europe to maintain law and order with extremely light-touch policing.

But once you import a large enough number of people who either do not understand or do not accept these tacit rules of behavior, life loses many of its little charms. More and more things which used to be regulated by unwritten agreement now have to be regulated by written law, and enforced by the state -- equally against all citizens, not just the tiny minority which caused the problems.

Caldwell's 2009 continues to reads like a screenplay for the next 10 years. And probably for the decade after that.


Christopher Caldwell on Christophe Guilluy on French Elites

If you want to understand what's wrong with European immigration policy, Christopher Caldwell's 2009 book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe is the best start:

In his provocative and unflinching book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, he reveals the anger of natives and newcomers alike. He describes asylum policies that have served illegal immigrants better than refugees. He exposes the strange interaction of welfare states and Third World traditions, the anti-Americanism that brings natives and newcomers together, and the arguments over women and sex that drive them apart. And he examines the dangerous tendency of politicians to defuse tensions surrounding Islam by curtailing the rights of all.

He has a long new piece on the French real estate consultant Christophe Guilluy, who was become an improbable analyst of French society. Actually, not so improbable: Choosing where to live strips away the bullshit and lays peoples' actual preferences (as opposed to their public pieties) about multiculturalism, diversity, etc. bare. Guilluy uses urban geography to create an analysis of the divisions plaguing French society:

In our day, the urban real-estate market is a pitiless sorting machine. Rich people and up-and-comers buy the private housing stock in desirable cities and thereby bid up its cost. Guilluy notes that one real-estate agent on the Île Saint-Louis in Paris now sells “lofts” of three square meters, or about 30 square feet, for €50,000. The situation resembles that in London, where, according to Le Monde, the average monthly rent (£2,580) now exceeds the average monthly salary (£2,300).

The laid-off, the less educated, the mistrained—all must rebuild their lives in what Guilluy calls (in the title of his second book) La France périphérique. This is the key term in Guilluy’s sociological vocabulary, and much misunderstood in France, so it is worth clarifying: it is neither a synonym for the boondocks nor a measure of distance from the city center. (Most of France’s small cities, in fact, are in la France périphérique.) Rather, the term measures distance from the functioning parts of the global economy. France’s best-performing urban nodes have arguably never been richer or better-stocked with cultural and retail amenities. But too few such places exist to carry a national economy. When France’s was a national economy, its median workers were well compensated and well protected from illness, age, and other vicissitudes. In a knowledge economy, these workers have largely been exiled from the places where the economy still functions. They have been replaced by immigrants.

After the mid-twentieth century, the French state built a vast stock—about 5 million units—of public housing, which now accounts for a sixth of the country’s households. Much of it is hideous-looking, but it’s all more or less affordable. Its purpose has changed, however. It is now used primarily for billeting not native French workers, as once was the case, but immigrants and their descendants, millions of whom arrived from North Africa starting in the 1960s, with yet another wave of newcomers from sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East arriving today. In the rough northern suburb of Aubervilliers, for instance, three-quarters of the young people are of immigrant background. Again, Paris’s future seems visible in contemporary London. Between 2001 and 2011, the population of white Londoners fell by 600,000, even as the city grew by 1 million people: from 58 percent white British at the turn of the century, London is currently 45 percent white.

While rich Parisians may not miss the presence of the middle class, they do need people to bus tables, trim shrubbery, watch babies, and change bedpans. Immigrants—not native French workers—do most of these jobs. Why this should be so is an economic controversy. Perhaps migrants will do certain tasks that French people will not—at least not at the prevailing wage. Perhaps employers don’t relish paying €10 an hour to a native Frenchman who, ten years earlier, was making €20 in his old position and has resentments to match. Perhaps the current situation is an example of the economic law named after the eighteenth-century French economist Jean-Baptiste Say: a huge supply of menial labor from the developing world has created its own demand.

This is not Guilluy’s subject, though. He aims only to show that, even if French people were willing to do the work that gets offered in these prosperous urban centers, there’d be no way for them to do it, because there is no longer any place for them to live. As a new bourgeoisie has taken over the private housing stock, poor foreigners have taken over the public—which thus serves the metropolitan rich as a kind of taxpayer-subsidized servants’ quarters. Public-housing inhabitants are almost never ethnically French; the prevailing culture there nowadays is often heavily, intimidatingly Muslim.

 At the opening of his new book, Guilluy describes twenty-first-century France as “an ‘American’ society like any other, unequal and multicultural.” It’s a controversial premise—that inequality and racial diversity are linked as part of the same (American-type) system and that they progress or decline together. Though this premise has been confirmed in much of the West for half a century, the assertion will shock many Americans, conditioned to place “inequality” (bad) and “diversity” (good) at opposite poles of a Manichean moral order. This disconnect is a key reason American political discussions have turned so illogical and rancorous. Certain arguments—for instance, that raising the incomes of American workers requires limiting immigration—can be cast as either sensible or superstitious, legitimate or illegitimate, good or evil, depending on whether the person making them is deemed to be doing so on the grounds of economics or identity....

France’s most dangerous political battles play out against this backdrop. The central fact is the 70 percent that we just spoke of: they oppose immigration and are worried, we can safely assume, about the prospects for a multiethnic society. Their wishes are consistent, their passions high; and a democracy is supposed to translate the wishes and passions of the people into government action. Yet that hasn’t happened in France.

Guilluy breaks down public opinion on immigration by class. Top executives (at 54 percent) are content with the current number of migrants in France. But only 38 percent of mid-level professionals, 27 percent of laborers, and 23 percent of clerical workers feel similarly....

As Paris has become not just the richest city in France but the richest city in the history of France, its residents have come to describe their politics as “on the left”—a judgment that tomorrow’s historians might dispute. Most often, Parisians mean what Guilluy calls la gauche hashtag, or what we might call the “glass-ceiling Left,” preoccupied with redistribution among, not from, elites: we may have done nothing for the poor, but we did appoint the first disabled lesbian parking commissioner....

Never have conditions been more favorable for deluding a class of fortunate people into thinking that they owe their privilege to being nicer, or smarter, or more honest, than everyone else. Why would they think otherwise? They never meet anyone who disagrees with them. The immigrants with whom the creatives share the city are dazzlingly different, exotic, even frightening, but on the central question of our time—whether the global economic system is working or failing—they see eye to eye....

Those outside the city gates in la France périphérique are invisible, their wishes incomprehensible. It’s as if they don’t exist. But they do.

The two traditional French parties—the Republicans, who once followed a conservative program elaborated by Charles de Gaulle; and the Socialists, who once followed socialism—still compete for votes, but along an ever-narrowing spectrum of issues. The real divide is no longer between the “Right” and the “Left” but between the metropoles and the peripheries. The traditional parties thrive in the former. The National Front (FN) is the party of the outside.

French elites have convinced themselves that their social supremacy rests not on their economic might but on their common decency. Doing so allows them to “present the losers of globalization as embittered people who have problems with diversity,” says Guilluy. It’s not our privilege that the French deplorables resent, the elites claim; it’s the color of some of our employees’ skin. French elites have a thesaurus full of colorful vocabulary for those who resist the open society: repli (“reaction”), crispation identitaire (“ethnic tension”), and populisme (an accusation equivalent to fascism, which somehow does not require an equivalent level of proof). One need not say anything racist or hateful to be denounced as a member of “white, xenophobic France,” or even as a “fascist.” To express mere discontent with the political system is dangerous enough. It is to faire le jeu de (“play the game of”) the National Front....

In France, political correctness is more than a ridiculous set of opinions; it’s also—and primarily—a tool of government coercion. Not only does it tilt any political discussion in favor of one set of arguments; it also gives the ruling class a doubt-expelling myth that provides a constant boost to morale and esprit de corps, much as class systems did in the days before democracy. People tend to snicker when the question of political correctness is raised: its practitioners because no one wants to be thought politically correct; and its targets because no one wants to admit to being coerced. But it determines the current polarity in French politics. Where you stand depends largely on whether you believe that antiracism is a sincere response to a genuine upsurge of public hatred or an opportunistic posture for elites seeking to justify their rule....

Like much in French intellectual life, Guilluy’s newest book is intelligent, original, and rather slapdash. Its maps, while brilliantly conceived, are poorly explained. Its forays into social science are mis-designed—Guilluy’s “indices of fragility” are based on redundant, highly correlated factors that exaggerate the points he means to make. The book has been assembled sloppily and, it seems, hastily. Long prose passages turn up twice on the same page, as if the editor spilled a cup of coffee while cutting and pasting....

But as the prospect of rising in the world is hampered or extinguished, the inducements to ideological conformism weaken. Dissent appears. Political correctness grows more draconian. Finally the ruling class reaches a dangerous stage, in which it begins to lose not only its legitimacy but also a sense of what its legitimacy rested on in the first place.


Mass Immigration Destroys the Center in France

MAIN-Calais-migrants

Wherever it's allowed to happen, the reckless policy of mass immigration hollows out the political center and feeds the extremes. It's happening in France, and will be happening in Germany soon, as well. The most dangerous threat to European social democracy isn't neoliberalism, or multinational corporations, or lobbyists, or anything like that. The most dangerous threat is mass immigration. If you want social democracy to survive, as I do, you must oppose mass immigration. It's that simple. 

Take France. I've been following the French presidential elections pretty closely. As the vote approaches, Le Pen is holding her own against stiff competition. But another candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has mounted a surprising late rally. He's the leader of "France insoumise" (France Unbowed, or France Defiant), which is the farthest-left party with a major candidate in the elections. He's skimming votes from disaffected socialists who believe the party hasn't done enough to reduce unemployment and protect welfare programs, and from those former Communists who haven't already switched allegiances to the Front National.

And what do he and Le Pen have in common? They are both skeptical of mass immigration. Of course, Mélenchon chooses his words much more carefully (f) -- he says we have to combat misery and war, the root causes, we can't just turn people away in the middle of the Mediterranean, etc. But over and over, he has said it would be best if they never left their home countries, and that he is adamantly against any right to free movement. Macron, the centrist, is still in the race and might make it to the run-off, but there's no question that his liberal stance on immigration and freedom of movement in the EU is hurting him among voters who do not belong to the educated urban haute bourgeoisie.

Which is, of course, the vast majority of them.

Mélenchon and Le Pen are winning because they are the only candidates to come out, without waffling and euphemisms, and say one thing clearly: Mass immigration is bad for France.

The poll numbers are almost unbelievably one-sided on this issue. Only 11% (f) of French think immigration has had a "positive" impact on French society, according to an august 2016 poll.

11%. Let that sink in.

The poll also found (f) that 57% of French thought there were too many immigrants in France, that 54% thought immigration had brought changes of which they disapproved, and 60% thought immigration had degraded public services. 65% thought refugees would be "unable" to integrate into French society, and 45% wanted to stop admitting them altogether. 67% thought terrorists had pretended to be refugees to get into France, and 54% thought most immigrants presenting themselves as refugees weren't really refugees.

Now, you could say that these numbers may be exaggerated because of recent Islamist terror attacks -- but then again, when hasn't there been a recent terrorist attack in Europe? Thanks to mass immigration both today and in the past, these attacks, and these poll numbers, are the new normal.

This is why descriptions of Le Pen as "extreme" are false. And why former comrades denouncing Mélenchon for adopting her "extreme" views are fools. Le Pen's views on immigration are solidly backed by an overwhelming majority of the French, who list immigration and security as their top concerns, along with unemployment. And if you think unemployment isn't closely connected to immigration in the minds of many French people, you're naive.

The pro-immigration educated urban bourgeoisie has lost the argument, and lost the middle. If they don't begin generating candidates who actually endorse positions favored by a majority of the people they claim to represent, they will abandon politics to the extremes, which will have a number of drastic consequences -- the first of which will be the destruction of the EU.

The urban haute bourgeoisie has to bear most of the responsibility for undermining the political center in their countries (which has already happened), and for crippling the EU (which seems more likely every day). They will have to swallow their pride and recognize that people in their countries want policies which favor people in their countries. Given their self-satisfaction and their uncanny ability to ignore what's in front of their nose, I'm not anticipating a change until it's much too late.


The Notary, Our Noble Master

Gardeavue

Watched this classic again last night. Lino Ventura plays a detective who subjects a wealthy local lawyer -- suspect in the rape and murder of two young girls -- to an hours-long interrogation in police headquarters. Lino Ventura intensely watchable as always with his Easter Island head and ludicrously gigantic hands. And Michel Serrault is perfectly cast as the clever, oleaginous yet despairing suspect. Romy Schneider, as his wife, is just plain Romy. She never really becomes anyone else no matter what role she plays, but you won't hear me complaining.

I first saw this movie years ago, before I was even a lawyer, in the U.S. Part of a Romy Schneider film festival. As I watched it again, a few memories of my earlier reaction to the movie came back. First of all, I remember being surprised when the detective tells the suspect that he can call a lawyer, but the lawyer is not entitled to meet him. "Whoa," I thought back then, "that's totally unconstitutional!" Which it would have been, in America.

The second cultural misunderstanding comes from the fact that everyone keeps mentioning that the suspect, Jérôme Martinaud, is a "notary". As an American, I said: "Who cares?" Yet this fact is mentioned several times, and the script calls attention to when and whether characters refer to the suspect as Master (Maître, the official designation for French lawyers and some other professionals). 

In fact, at the time I saw the movie, I was a notary, even though I didn't even have a college degree. In the U.S., the only function of a "notary public" is to put a stamp on official sworn documents. You just ask someone if the document is accurate, get them to sign it, and stamp it. Anyone over 18 who doesn't have a serious criminal record can be a notary. Anyone. You just fill out a form, pay a small fee, and bingo! you're in.

The situation is vastly different in Continental Europe, where notaries must be lawyers. Not only that, they benefit from an ancient privilege system that (1) requires dozens of different kinds of documents to be notarized, and (2) limits the overall number of notaries. This grants most notaries a regional monopoly, reducing competition and driving up costs. The Economist describes the cultural divide:

Notaries are important gatekeepers in many economies, in particular when it comes to establishing property rights—the bedrock of markets. At best, notaries are facilitators who, for instance, verify the identity of the signatories of contracts and the veracity of their statements. At worst, they are overpaid bureaucrats who delay the passage of simple transactions and bloat their cost.

By contrast, notaries are unknown in many common-law countries, such as Britain and its former empire, which take a more freewheeling approach to contracts. America is the odd country out: although its legal system is based on common law, it boasts 4.8m notaries, many part-time. Yet these exist mainly to satisfy America’s maddening appetite for stamps and seals, and have little in common with their highly qualified European namesakes. “They are butchers, bakers and candlestick-makers,” scoffs a European notary.

Both traditions have their drawbacks. In Europe notaries’ highly regulated work has made them the most prosperous of lawyers. Tax returns suggest that Italian notaries are paid better than any other professionals (though perhaps they are most honest about their earnings). A report in 2004 found that notaries made up 22 of Slovenia’s 100 highest earners. French ones are the most privileged of all, says Gisela Shaw, an expert on the profession. They can compete with solicitors to provide legal services. They may sell their practice when they retire.

A website on French property law notes:

With about 5,000 offices, 7,500 notaires and 40,000 assistants, the notarial profession has representation all over France and has an effective monopoly. The Notaire is the public official responsible for receiving all the "actes" and contracts to which the parties wish to confer the seal of authenticity, to assure their date, to hold them in trust and to deliver authentic copies of them.

The Notaire is under the authority of the Minister of Justice (Ministère de la Justice) and is appointed by decree. The Notaire's office (Etude) depends geographically on the area in which he lives.

So the status Jérôme enjoys result from the fact that he is a member of perhaps the most privileged group in French society: lawyers who have gained a coveted notary position. One of Jérôme's first lines of defense is that people are always starting rumors about him because they envy his wealth and social status, which explains why people are circulating unfounded rumors about his involvement in the murders.

It doesn't happen often, but there you have it: an instance in which comparative-law knowledge deepens your understanding of art!


The Sweariest Case Against Dubbing You'll Ever Hear

Living in Germany as an English-speaking expat is probably easier than living in France. France may be more charmante, but in Germany, stuff works. Having stuff work is a type of charm in itself. The kind that's important when you have to actually live there.

Paul Taylor, an English ginger and comedian who lives in the Hexagon has an amusing YouTube series called "What the Fuck, France?" which explore some of the peculiarities of French life. As you might expect from the title, they're extremely sweary. Why? Because English people are extremely fucking sweary, you fucking knob. Yes, I know that's a fucking cultural stereotype, you condescending prick, but stereotypes exist for a fucking reason.

Here Taylor takes on dubbing, the bane of every expat's existence: 

I will say, in Germany's defense, that German dubbing is extremely good. They've had decades of practice, and they're German. As I said, stuff works here.

The odd thing is I was just in Paris over the weekend, and I can't help noticing that France is rapidly catching up to Germany in the having-stuff-that-works department. The metros and buses run on time and have clear signs, the system of tickets is a hell of a lot simpler than in any German city, and everything's quite clean and orderly, even in the shabbier parts of town. There is still more dogshit on Paris streets, though.

Yet one day, sooner than you think, we are going to reach the Continental Singularity. As Germany gets more random and disorderly and France improves, there will come a time in which the orderlines efficiency of France's infrastructure, bureaucracy, and daily life are all as efficient as Germany's, a condition last seen only in 1788. 


German Word of the Week: Natursekt

Put the kiddies to bed, because this German Word of the Week gets a little blue. Or golden.

Recent events put Donald Trump's alleged partiality to a certain, er, erotic fetish in the spotlight. In English, this fetish is called "golden showers".

In German it's called Natursekt: "Nature's Champagne". Now, of course this isn't a perfect translation, since Sekt is better translated as prosecco or sparkling wine. It's the term used for any sparkling wine which doesn't come from Champagne, the French region which, of course, has a controlled legal monopoly stopping anyone from calling a sparkling wine Champagne unless it's made there by their methods.

And needless to say, Champagne isn't made from urine, unless humanity has been the victim of the greatest hoax the world has ever known (memo to self: write screenplay based on this premise).

But I still think, "Nature's Champagne" is really more true to the light-hearted perversion of the original. I anticipate millions of Germans will encounter the term Natursekt for the first time in the next few days, so keep an eye on this graph.

Of course, millions of Germans already know this term. One of the main reasons is that prostitution is legal in Germany, and working girls, and boys, openly publish their "set cards" on the Internet. Here's one (g) I found, "Carmen" from the Eroscenter Ludwigsburg, which I found completely at random from a website I have never visited before and will never visit again, presented here to you strictly in the name of Science. Carmen says that she is not willing to be the, er, recipient of Nature's Champagne, but is happy to provide that service to her guests.

And what is the proper pairing with Nature's Champagne? Why, Nature's Caviar (g), of course! No, I didn't just make that up. Those who are of a mind to consider Germans ultra-perverse will be unsurprised to learn that paraphilias having to do with human excreta are, in German, compared to mankind's most refined gastronomic delicacies.

After this post, I need a shower -- and not the golden kind (ba-da-BOOM!).


Chicago's Bloody Christmas Makes International News

The BBC Newsbrief yesterday mentioned the shooting of 27 people over Christmas in Chicago. So did th Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Canoe.ca, and Le Monde.

One thing none of these newspapers mentioned was the demographic profile of the shooters and victims. There was talk of 'gangs' and 'high-crime neighborhoods', which all Americans can immediately decipher. But in case my foreign readers are wondering, this is what it's all about:

Chiav morr

(source). Although the majority of assailants has yet to be identified (it's hard to investigate crimes in black neighborhoods because witnesses distrust police and fear retaliation from the shooters, who are often well-known), nobody is assuming they're white.

Violent crime has always been a disproportionately black / Hispanic affair in the U.S., but it appears to be getting even more extremely concentrated. Not necessarily because black and Hispanic crime rates are going up -- they are, in some cities, but not dramatically overall -- but because U.S. urban whites and Asians are quickly becoming one of the most law-abiding groups in human history.

Thanks to gentrification and rising costs of living, the white populations of major U.S. citizens are becoming quite rich. This means the only groups left in cities who continue to commit any kind of violent crime at all are blacks and Hispanics. Despite a record wave of 750+ homicides in Chicago this year overall, some predominantly white neighborhoods had no homicides at all.

So feel free to visit Chicago, which is a delightful place. The locals will tell you which neighborhoods to avoid. Even if you visited them, you probably won't have a problem, since most of these killings are gang-related, and you're not in a gang. But you could be hit by a stray bullet.


...meanwhile in France: Listlessness, Gloom, Mistrust

This handy summary of a poll about attitudes toward government in France comes courtesy of the right-wing Gatestone Institute, and is based on this poll (f):

Public Opinion: In January 2016, Cevipof, a think tank of the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po), released its seventh Barometer of Political Trust, a poll published annually to measure the values of democracy in the country, and based on interviews with 2074 people:

  • What is your current state of mind? Listlessness 31%, Gloom 29%, Mistrust 28%, Fear: 10%
  • Do you trust government? Not much 58%, not at all 32%
  • Do you trust lawmakers? Not much 39%, not at all 16%%
  • Do you trust the president? Not much 32%; not at all 38%
  • Do politicians care about what the people think? Not much 42%, not at all 46%
  • How democracy is working in France? Not well 43%, not well at all 24%
  • Do you trust political parties? Not much 47%, not at all 40%
  • Do you trust the media? Not much 48% not at all 27 %
  • What do you feel about politics? Distrust 39%; disgust 33%, boredom 8%
  • What do you feel about politicians? Disappointment 54%; disgust 20%
  • Corruption of politicians? Yes 76%
  • Too many migrants? Yes, plus tend to agree: 65%
  • Islam is a threat? Yes, plus tend to agree: 58%
  • Proud to be French? Yes 79%

I don't know about you, but I'd say these numbers are good news for a certain Marine. But then again, French people have been feeling this way for quite some time:

More frenchy


The World Will "Come to Terms" with Migration Flows...by Stopping Them

Holocaust survivor and Labour Lord Alf Dubs, sponsor of legislation to bring some very self-described "unaccompanied minors" from the "Jungle" camp in Calais to Britain, said: “The world has to come to terms with the fact that migration flows are going to become a norm.”

This the typical refrain of the Great and Good: They're coming, there's nothing we can do about it, so just lie back and think of England. The funny thing about migration flows, the thing Dubs doesn't mention, is that they are all one-way. From the Third World to Europe (at least in this hemisphere). Not a whole lot of people are clamoring to move from, say, Andorra to Angola.

So actually, he wants us to lie back and think of the millions of random strangers in Pakistan, India, Burma, Sudan, Chad, Eritrea, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Nigeria, Botswana, Ghana, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Georgia, Albania, Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Egypt who are sitting on packed suitcases, desperate to relocate to the (comparatively) safe, prosperous, well-governed, orderly, clean nations of Europe.

Lord Dubs is sympathetic to this undifferentiated mass of random strangers because he was rescued as a child from the Holocaust. But the Holocaust isn't happening today, nor is anything like it happening today (Yes, I checked). What's happening today is the same old stew of ethnic conflict, civil wars, corrupt elites, and economic stagnation which has always plagued the Third World, and -- in relative terms compared to the West -- always will. And in fact there's a lot less suffering in the Third World than there ever has been in human history, thanks to mankind's ever-increasing ability to solve conflicts peacefully and provide for a growing population.

The overwhelming majority of the population of Europe, however you define it, does not believe the solution to the world's problems is to allow millions of random strangers to stream across Europe's external borders:

“We don’t want them!” shouted the demonstrators in this village of 1,900 people, 80 miles from Calais, where the migrants were bused from a camp known as the Jungle on Monday.

“This is our home!” others yelled at the darkened, disused retirement home where the migrants were being housed. Inside the building, a young Sudanese man pressed his face to the window and looked out at the angry crowd, bemused.

All over France, tiny communities like this one, in the old battlefields of the country’s north, are being forced to deal firsthand with Europe’s migrant crisis.

It has not been easy. The effort to relocate many of the 6,000 or more people who had made the Jungle their home has thrust France’s divided view of the migrants into plain view....

But outside on the sidewalk, the mood was grim. “No migrants in Croisilles!” read a banner that more than 100 people — men, women and children — milled around. A half-dozen police officers, incongruous in the quiet country town, stood warily by....

Some places have gritted their collective teeth and accepted the migrants without fuss. Others have haggled over the number and demanded that it be reduced, as in Saint-Bauzille-de-Putois, in the Cévennes mountain range.

In other places, residents, anticipating the migrants’ arrival, have hurled stones at the housing sites or set them on fire, as in Loubeyrat, in the Puy-de-Dôme department.

In Pierrefeu-du-Var, in the south, pro- and anti-migrant groups have held dueling demonstrations....

The divisions have been starkly evident this week in this plain-vanilla brick village, once an agricultural center. It was leveled by the Germans in World War I, then rebuilt, and is now largely a bedroom community for the nearby regional capital, Arras....

But it has been hard. “It’s been hell here,” said Raphaëlle Maggiotto, a City Council member and an ally of the mayor. She had not slept in days. “Demonstrations every day. They came to my home. They yelled my name.”

On Tuesday morning, the central square, with its monument to the World War I dead and its 1920s Art Deco city hall, was calm after the previous evening’s noisy demonstration.

“The village is divided,” said Sebastien Okoniewski, who runs the cafe in the square.

All around him, his customers grumbled about the new arrivals, but his own name testified to the immigration — a Polish influx in the early 20th century, along with Italians and Portuguese — that has shaped their region....

“There is hatred in Croisilles,” said a volunteer at the retirement home, Guislane Poutrain. “I’ve never seen this before. I don’t recognize Croisilles anymore. I’m really disappointed.”

Dubs still clings to the notion that "the people" can be convinced to accept mass migration. As this story from France shows (one of a million data points), he is deluded. French people like France the way it is. Or to put it more precisely, they like France the way it is infinitely better than they imagine it would be like after the influx of 5 million Africans. And the same goes for Italians, Poles, Czechs, and Finns. As someone who's come to appreciate the many achievements of European cultures, I agree with them.

The reception of the migrants in France shows the explosive power of this issue to divide people and erode trust in leaders and institutions. Following Dubs' recommendation to "come to terms" with non-selective mass migration flows is not just foolish, but dangerous. It reflects ignorance about how European societies actually see themselves right now (as opposed to how they might or should see themselves in the fond dreams of academics). It's an idiotic gamble, like taking a bunch of random volatile chemicals, throwing them into a big heated pot, and hoping the outcome will be gold. Or at least, you know, non-lethal.

There will still be a few years of haggling and last-ditch resistance, but the world will come to terms with "migration flows"...by stopping them. And that will be a good thing, both for Europe and for the countries from which the economic migrants come.


Paul Berman Finally Makes Some Good Points

Paul Berman, eager supporter of the Iraq War, has a lot to answer for. But in this essay in The Tablet, on how Americans see the French veil/burkini debate, he makes up for some of his past grievous idiocies:

The assumption is that France wants to regulate Islamic attire because the French are fundamentally biased against their Muslim minority. The French are frightened of the “Other.” They are unrepentant in their imperialist and colonialist hatreds for the peoples of North Africa. They are, in short, hopelessly racist. Worse: The French left is just as bad as the French right in these regards, and the Socialist Party, as exemplified lately by the prime minister, Manuel Valls, is especially bad.

And yet, the American interpretation acknowledges a complicating point, which is this: The French, who are hopelessly racist, do not appear to believe they are hopelessly racist. On the contrary, they have talked themselves into the belief that, in setting out to regulate Islamic attire, they are acting in exceptionally high-minded ways—indeed, are acting in accordance with a principle so grand and lofty that French people alone are capable of understanding it.

This principle is a French absurdity that, in its loftiness, cannot even be stated in down-to-earth English, but can only be expressed with an incomprehensible, untranslatable and unpronounceable French locution, which is laïcité. Over the years, the word laïcité has figured repeatedly in the American commentaries. The French, we are told, invoke this word to defend their unjustifiable and racist persecutions. And yet, like all words that are untranslatable and incomprehensible, laïcité turns out merely to be a cover. It is a ten-dollar word employed to justify France’s fear of the “Other”; France’s zeal for maintaining the racial superiority of the non-Muslim French; France’s enduring imperialist and colonialist hatred for native peoples; France’s obsession with telling women what to do; and generally France’s urge to be parochial, petty, ultraconservative, and intolerant....

The French controversy over the veil—which, in the French debate, has meant the Islamic headscarf or hijab, too—got underway not with the arrival of the Muslim immigrants, but with the arrival of the Islamists. This was in 1989. Schoolgirls in the town of Creil, outside Paris, began to insist on their right to wear the Islamic veil in school. This was unprecedented, and the school authorities forbade it. The schoolgirls insisted, even so. And the question of how to interpret this dispute became, very quickly, a national debate in France, with plausible arguments on both sides.

To wit, pro-veil: Shouldn’t a woman and even a schoolgirl have the right to dress in accordance with her own religious conscience? Isn’t religious attire a matter of individual right and religious freedom? More: If Muslim schoolgirls are displaying fidelity to their own religion and its traditions, shouldn’t this be deemed an enrichment of the broader French culture? Shouldn’t the French welcome the arrival of a new kind of piety? And if, instead, the French refuse to welcome, shouldn’t their refusal be seen as the actual problem—not the pious immigrant schoolgirls, but the anti-immigrant bigots?

To which the anti-veil argument replied: No, the veil has been brought into the schools as a maneuver by a radical movement to impose its dress code. The veil is a proselytizing device, intended to intimidate the Muslim schoolgirls and to claim a zone of Islamist power within the school. And the dress code is the beginning of something larger, which is the Islamist campaign to impose a dangerous new political program on the public school curriculum in France. This is the campaign that has led students in the suburban immigrant schools to make a series of new demands—the demand that Rousseau and certain other writers no longer be taught; the demand that France’s national curriculum on WWII, with its emphasis on lessons of the Holocaust, be abandoned; the demand that France’s curricular interpretation of Middle Eastern history no longer be taught; the demand that co-ed gym classes no longer be held, and so forth. The wearing of veils in the schools, then—this is the beginning of a larger campaign to impose an Islamist worldview on the Muslim immigrants, and to force the rest of society to step aside and allow the Islamists to have their way. From this standpoint, opposition to the veil is a defense of the schools, and it is a defense of freedom and civilization in France, and it is not an anti-immigrant policy.

The French have engaged in a very vigorous and nuanced public debate over these matters. And yet, for some reason, in the reporting by American journalists and commentators, the nuances tend to disappear, and the dispute is almost always presented in its pro-veil version, as if it were an argument between individual religious freedom and anti-immigrant bigots, and not anything else. To report both sides of the dispute ought not to be so hard, however. The French government held formal hearings on these questions, with both sides represented. It was just that, once the hearings were over, the anti-veil side was deemed to have been more persuasive. Crucially influential were Muslim schoolgirls who, given the chance to speak, testified that, in the schools, Islamist proselytizers had become a menace to girls like themselves. And the National Assembly passed a law banning the Islamic veil, along with all “ostentatious” religious symbols, from the schools. The purpose of this law was not to suppress Islam. Students could continue to wear discreet symbols in school, according to the new law, and anything they wanted, outside of school. But ostentatious symbols were banned from the schools, in the hope of putting a damper on the Islamist proselytizing....

What about laïcité, then—this French concept that gets invoked in the debate, yet cannot even be expressed in English? In reality,laïcité is entirely translatable. It means secularism. There is no reason for English speakers to use the French word. And the concept is perfectly comprehensible. It is the Jeffersonian principle of a wall between church and state, in its French version. The Jeffersonian principle in America means that, regardless of what the churches may do or say, the American state will remain strictly nonreligious. The French version is the same. The public schools, for instance, must not become creatures of the churches—which, in our present situation, means the Islamist imams.

It is true that, in France, people take their secularism a little further than Americans tend to do, and this is partly on historical grounds. In America, we worry about freedom of religion, but in France, where everyone remembers the Catholic past and the religious wars, people worry about freedom from religion. They do not want to be tyrannized by theological fanatics. The Islamist movement is, from this point of view, all too familiar to the French—one more clericalist current that wishes to imposes its theological doctrines on everyone else. And, in the face of the Islamist fanaticism, the French are grateful for their secularist traditions and laws.

Then again, the French take their secularism a little further than we Americans do also because they are willing to grant government a larger administrative role than Americans tend to do. Americans are allergic to government regulation, or pretend to be, but the French do not even pretend to be. I realize that a great many Americans believe that, as a result of the French willingness to accept government regulation, France has become an impoverished Communist despotism. But have you been to France? Perhaps it is true that labor regulations have lately become an obstacle to high employment. Even so, France is, in many respects, a better-run country than the United States. And the French naturally look to the government to apply secularist principles even in areas of life that Americans might regard as outside the zone of government, local or national. The permissibility of religious attire, for instance. And the French see something attractive in their government regulations.