I was recently reading Charles Taylor's 1996 lecture "A Catholic Modernity?" when I came across an amusing passage which I'll shortly excerpt. Taylor is a Canadian philosopher whose work focuses on the emergence of the modern identity and the changing place of religion in society. His 1989 book Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, is a massive edifice of learning that traces the emergence of the modern idea of the self -- how humans came to conceive of themselves independently of their role in society, with an interior space for reflection and a capacity to overcome our instinctual drives. I haven't read his latest tome (he writes big books), "A Secular Age," but it's sitting there on my bookshelf.
Taylor is also a practicing Roman Catholic. His religious commitment generally doesn't come out in his philosophical works (except in that he generally parts company with the anti-humanists). When he was invited to give the "Marianist Lecture" at Dayton University in 1996, though, he spoke from a more personal perspective. The lecture was reprinted in a short book with comments from several other thinkers, some Catholic, some not.
Taylor argues that, ironically, secular critiques of religious institutions were essential to the advancement of religious ideas beyond the confines of the church. Even in highly secular Western societies, for instance, people are expected to care about and donate money to people they doesn't even know, in far-away countries -- and regularly do so. In essence, the Enlightenment critique "broke the shell" of Christianity, permitting values originally identified with Christianity to seep out and inform the elements of the humanitarian, "civilized" secular world-view, such an aspiration toward universal respect for human rights, concern for the fate of people in less-developed nations, etc. (This seems to be to be similar to what Juergen Habermas has been saying recently). At the same time, the breakdown of the Catholic Church's ethical monopoly and the emergence of an independent secular world-view capable of developing ethical positions independent of religious dictates provided competition for Christianity, forcing it gradually to curb some of its abuses and abandon its theocratic pretensions.
Of course, I'm not doing the essay justice. But this passage, in particular, struck me:
A Buddhist friend of mine from Thailand briefly visited the German Greens. He confessed to utter bewilderment. He thought he understood the goals of the party: peace between human beings and a stance of respect and friendship by humans toward nature. What astonished him was all the anger, the tone of denunciation and hatred toward the established parties. These people didn't seem to see that the first step toward their goal would have to involve stilling the anger and aggression in themselves. He couldn't understand what they were up to.
I've added this quotation to a storehouse of encounters between non-Germans (often English or American intellectuals) and their German counterparts, in which the foreigner remarks on the what seems to be the superfluous bitterness of intellectual discourse in Germany. English speakers respect Heine's poetic achievements but are left bewildered by his cruel attacks on less-talented colleagues. Auden famously couldn't stand Brecht ("a most unpleasant man"). Fritz Stern, after surveying academic discourse in 19th-century Germany, expressed his relief at being able to return to the comparatively bland but much less overheated atmosphere of American academic discourse. Although most of the targets of Karl Kraus' polemical gifts were certainly deserving, the constant tone of sputtering hatred eventually tends to wear most non-German readers out. The examples could go on...
I also often feel a bit puzzled by the sheer bitterness of many ideological debates in the German-language public sphere. Three characteristics stand out in particular:
- Overkill -- the use of more point-scoring sarcasm and vicious rhetoric than necessary to make the author's argument.
- The utter lack of concern to find common ground with the opposing side. This may be due to the fact, noted by that long-time observer of European intellectuals, Tony Judt, that Continental thinkers frequently pontificate on subjectes they don't understand, such as monetary policy or genetic research. It's easier to have a measured, enlightening argument when both sides understand the basic tenets of the field they're addressing.
- A certain creeping anti-pluralism: "Not only am I right, but the people who disagree with me are fools, and the world would be a better place if everyone agreed with me."
Note that I'm not saying that every public debate in Germany is conducted this way -- people who have genuine power (trade union bosses, politicians, public figures, and the like) are usually quite reasonable, and reach compromises all the time. No, this tendency seems most pronounced among intellectuals. Of course, intellectuals are famously acerbic in every culture, but it seems to me that they're just a little bit more so in Germany (and perhaps in continental Europe as a whole). Am I on to something here?
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