German Joys

The Dangerously Non-Dangerous Book for Boys

In 2006, a British father and son wrote The Dangerous Book for Boys.  It's supposed to evoke those long-past days when, instead of vegetating for hours in front of glimmering consoles, young boys dreamed of adventure, played outside, and sometimes got hurt.  It had information on Antarctic explorers, famous historical battles, building catapults, tying knots, navigating in the woods.  Plus anecdotes about bone-crushing sports and their heroes.  And some sections on history and honor and loyalty and other old-fashioned virtues. It sounds like a kind of updated Boy Scout manual.  I should note that I haven't read the book.  As will shortly become clear, this post isn't really about the book's contents.

The book was a success in Britain, and soon an American version came out.  Some changes were made -- mainly removing Britain-specific themes like rugby, and adding in more references to American history. 

Now, the German version is here (G).  But wait -- we wouldn't want to make Germany a dangerous place, would we?  No, we wouldn't.  So the entire chapter on historical battles has been removed, as has the "Brief History of Artillery."  The Ten Commandments has been replaced by -- wait for it -- an essay on international human rights.  Any mention of rabbit hunting is also gone.  The first reviewer (G) on the Amazon.de page is disgusted: "[T]he English version was so successful because, among other reasons, it addressed subjects that run contrary to the gobbeldygook of 'peace education', and which boys would actually find interesting, at least in secret."

I'm with him.  These changes do at least two impermissible things.  First of all, they alter the contents of the book.  This is the capital crime, the cardinal sin, of the translator's art. It would be equivalent to me translating a German novel and substituting all the sex scenes with uplifting homilies to chastity, because I personally believed that people like the ones portrayed in the novel shouldn't be having sex.  Second, the 'opinion elite' sense of privilege seems to have struck again.  The changes were not made because the original references would not be understood in Germany (which would be a legitimate reason, given authorial consent), but simply to 'disappear' aspects of the book which might make the average German literary professional uneasy.  The chapter on human rights is especially ludicrous.  What, a reasonable 12-year-old boy might ask, is so bloody dangerous about human rights?

These changes reflect almost unimaginable self-aggrandizement, I would say.  Whatever German literary professional made these changes expressed the unmistakable belief that his values and his sensibilities are more legitimate than those of his audience.  The fact that many people may have bought this book precisely because it's the kind of book that might have information about battles seems to be irrelevant.  The changes also reflect a fundamental distrust of the public -- boys are being denied information about battles presumably because they might end up wanting to fight them.  I rather doubt that would happen, but who am I to question the immortal wisdom of a German editor?

I don't want to be too hasty assigning blame here.  I don't know whether the translator himself was responsible for any or all of these changes.  And if the authors approved them or instigated them, then I suppose we've just got to grit our teeth and accept it.  I have send off an email to the authors to see whether they know of these changes. I'll let you know what I find out.

UPDATE: I got a nice response from one of the authors of the book.  He said that he understood there would be some changes to the book to make it more suitable for a German audience, but that he was not aware of the extent of the changes and did not approve them.  He said he would be complaining to the publishers. 

I should note that negotiating translation rights is a complex business.  It's always good to keep in mind that authors may have less control over translations than the lay public might think.

Laqueuer: Europe's Doomed. Moravcsik: Fiddlesticks!

This blog's been getting pretty dialectical lately, so let's have another thesis-antithesis post. Walter Laqueur pronounces on Europe's future in the Chronicle of Higher Education:

In brief, by the turn of the millennium, at the very latest, it should have been clear that Europe was no longer on the road to superpower status, but that it faced an existential crisis — or, perhaps more accurately, a number of major crises, of which the demographic problem was the most severe. That began to be recognized almost immediately, but there was confusion, because the crisis seemed intractable — it had been discovered too late. One could only hope that the newcomers indifferent or hostile to European values would gradually show more tolerance, if not enthusiasm, toward them, or that multiculturalism, which had been such a disappointment, would perhaps work in the long run.

Those were not exactly strong hopes, and they certainly do not explain the illusions of some foreign observers, particularly Americans, who continued to claim that the 21st century would be Europe's. They maintained that there had been a revolution in Europe, of which Americans were not even aware. Europe had a vision of justice and harmony very much in contrast to the American dream, which no longer existed. The European vision emphasized the collective, in contrast to the narrow stress on individualism in the United States. It preferred the quality of life to amassing money. Americans had to work harder than Europeans, had fewer holidays, did not live as long as the Europeans, and, generally speaking, enjoyed life much less. Europeans were selfless, it was argued. As one observer put it, power politics was a thing of the past; Europe's main weapons were justice and the law. Coming from Europe, that idea would spread all over the world and become the main instrument in world politics.

Now for the antithesis: Europe's doom isn't inevitable. Let's not forget that many who predict it also desire it, for a variety of reasons ideological and economic (not that Laqueur belongs in this category). If Walter Laqueur gets you down, I'd suggest Andrew Moravcsik's cautiously optimistic assessment:

To most who live in Europe—or have visited lately—all this [doomsaying] seems wrong, even absurd. As the European Union turns 50 this week, let us consider all that has been achieved. Europe arose from the ashes of the Great Depression and World War II to become whole and free. Half a century ago, only a utopian would have predicted that, today, one can traverse Europe from Sweden to Sicily without encountering a border control and—most of the way—using a single European currency. Or that a tariff-free single market would exist, cemented by a common framework of economic regulation.

Europe is now a global superpower of world-historical importance, second to none in economic clout. It has constructed one of the most successful systems of government—the modern social-welfare state, which for all its flaws has brought unprecedented prosperity and security to Europe's people. It is the single most successful advance in voluntary international cooperation in modern history. The original European Economic Community of 1957 has grown from its founding six members to 27, knitting together just under 500 million people from the western Aran Islands of Ireland through the heart of Central Europe to the Black Sea. Its values are spreading across the globe—far more attractive, in many respects, than those of America. If anything, Europe's trajectory is up, not down. Here's what the critics get wrong.

Now for my two cents. Laqueur thinks that opposition to America's foreign policy and values, especially as embodied by the Bush Administration, drove many commentators to overestimate Europe's prospects. It's a sort of wishful thinking: "I find Europe's approach so much more pleasing and consonant with my views, therefore it must be the wave of the future."

I don't disagree with Laqueur on many points. It's become clear that there are worrying fissures at the heart of many European countries. Further, Europe's stock (as a shining beacon of reason and conciliation compared to the U.S.) has hit a new high against the background of the Bush administration, but will fade once someone halfway competent enters the White House. I'm not quite as pessimistic about Europe's demographic future as Laqueur, but there's no doubt that a demographic time bomb is ticking, and the people who might be able to defuse it are still bickering bitterly with each other.

I'm a Europhile not because I think European values will prevail, but because I think they should prevail. Sure, Europe's social welfare systems do saddle it with some competitive disadvantages. That's why I found the parts of Jeremy Rifkin's European Dream -- the parts in which he assumed away these disadvantages -- so unconvincing. They're there, and they're found not only in some EU and national policies, but also in the mindset of many denizens of Europe. However, from what I have seen and experienced, Moravcsik's thesis holds: the competitive disadvantages are greatly outweighed by the benefits social welfare systems bring to European residents. And there's no question that many of the foreigners I talk to here in Germany are quietly impressed by Germany's social-welfare system. Many of the leaders of the countries these people come from promise their residents a welfare state, but Germany actually delivers one. As long as the vast majority of the world's population continues to prefer welfare-state models to unrestrained capitalism, the European dream will remain alive.

France: Not Crumbling, says Judt

The estimable Tony Judt (whose Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals 1944-1956 I just finished) takes to the op-ed page of the New York Times to -- gasp -- sort of mildly defend Jacques Chirac! In passing, he aims a few darts at America's Europhobes

On both sides of the Atlantic, Mr. Chirac’s political obituary is being written in distinctly unflattering terms.

But is the French situation really so dire? From every quarter one hears calls for “reform” to bring France more in line with Anglo-American practices and policies. The dysfunctional French social model, we are frequently assured, has failed. In that case there is much to be said for failure. French infants have a better chance of survival than American ones. The French live longer than Americans and they live healthier (at far lower cost). They are better educated and have first-rate public transportation. The gap between rich and poor is narrower than in the United States or Britain, and there are fewer poor people.

Yes, France has high youth unemployment, thanks to institutionalized impediments to job creation. But the comparison to American rates is misleading: our figures are artificially lowered because so many dark-skinned men aged 18 to 30 are in prison and thus off the unemployment rolls.

The Twelve Gates of European Hell

A short while ago, Ed Philp brought our attention to a mimeographed tract he received in his mailbox one day. By popular request, I have scanned it as a .pdf file; download it here (g). There's some strange bitching about the German flag and alleged hostility thereto, followed by a story of how the European Flag came to bear twelve stars on a blue background. The problem is, the story is depressingly plausible (though I've no idea if it's really true) and even-handed. There are some explicitly religious disquisitions of the meaning of the number 12, but nothing very feverish.

The sheet of paper is pretty interesting. However, I must say I expect more unhinged ranting from mimeographed one-page complaints stuffed by cranks into local mailboxes.

Another Steyn Stillbirth

Mark Steyn's daily dose of Europe-bashing takes up the debate in Germany over setting up places where overwhelmed mothers of newborn babies can abandon them. Steyn concludes:

Germany has one of the lowest fertility rates in Europe, net population loss, and a rapidly depopulating east that’s economically unsustainable. Thirty per cent of German women are childless, 40 per cent of female university graduates are childless, and its last election offered voters what Americans would regard as the statistically improbable choice of a childless man vs a childless woman. Meanwhile, the last gals in the country still in the procreation business have to be offered E-Z-trash drop-off bins in order to stop them tossing their bairns out the apartment window.

All this depravity and horror, Steyn gravely intones, makes it "harder not to conclude that parts of Europe are evolving into a kind of post-human society."

Man, that stings. I mean, you've got to sink pretty low as a society to offer mothers places where they can abandon their precious little newborn babies. Thank God America's strong family values keep it from following Germany's depraved lead. Except, of course, for those 40 naughty states that have already passed "secret safe place for newborns " acts basically identical to what Germany's proposing. After a comparable outbreak of newborns being abandoned and strangled by desperate new mothers.

Oh, and by the way, Gerhard Schroeder has two children. They're adopted, though, so perhaps that doesn't count. Note to Monsieur Steyn: you can use the fact that they were adopted from Russia [cue threatening string glissandi] for your next juvenile crack! [Hat-tip, Ed Philp]

A Steyn on Canada's Honor

British writer Johann Hari here slips the shiv to exasperatingly well-publicized loudmouth Mark Steyn, "an uneducated former Disk Jockey turned pundit" who wrote a book called "America Alone" which trots out the whole "Eurabia" prediction so beloved of American Europe-bashers. Steyn, Hari notes, hasn't the faintest idea what he's talking about:

[F]or Steyn's predictions to hold true, the current Muslim birthrate needs to hold steady through five decades of life in the West, all Muslims have to become communitarian Islamists bent on sharia law, and there must be no natalist policies from European governments in the meanwhile.

Perhaps sensing this groaning crack in the foundation of his argument, Steyn adds hastily: "It is not necessary, incidentally, for Islam to become a statistical majority in order to function as one. At the height of its power in the eighth century, the 'Islamic world' stretched from Spain to India yet its population was only minority Muslim." But they were - a fairly obvious difference - not electoral democracies, where any group has to command a majority to rule.

Well-put, except I don't know what a "groaning crack" might be. I can report with considerable relief that Steyn is a Canadian. However, the U.S. cannot escape some blame bere. After dismantling Steyn's book for a good 4 pages, Hari notes: "It is a startling indictment of the intellectual standards of the American right that they have welcomed this Eurabian fiction with anything other than cheap, repulsed laughter."

Herzog & Gerken on the EU

Yes, I know this is coming a month or so too late, but it's still pretty interesting. Former German Federal President Roman Herzog and Lüder Gerken, Director of the Center for European Politics, critique (G) the EU for its intransparency, its inflexibility, and its lack of accountability.

They cite a study claiming that, from 1998 to 2004, 84% of the decision of the German Bundestag originate in Brussels, and that, contrary to common belief, they are some of the most important laws passed in Germany. Their critique s not directed so much at the structure of the EU (although the EU's "democracy deficit" is addressed), but at the increasing centralization of power in Brussels.

They pretty much dismiss the EU Constitution, arguing that it will do almost nothing to solve the EU's structural problems, and in fact will firmly entrench some of the worst ones. Herzog and Gerken propose four reforms:

1. An exclusive catalog of competencies that limits Brussels' power;
2. Enacting the "discontinuity principle," which would mean that legislative initiatives that are not passed within a single session expire, instead of waiting around session after session until they are passed;
3. Creating a formal procedure for re-assigning specific subject-matter competencies from Brussels to individual member-states;
4. Creating a "supreme court" for competency questions. The court's exclusive purpose would be to decide whether, e.g., pesticide regulation would be a matter for individual Member States or for the EU.

I might post a bit more about this later, but am a bit pressed for time . My question is this -- has this proposal sparked much debate in the German-language media? How about the English-speaking media? I'd be grateful if anyone could point me to a link or two if they happen to know. [Hat-tip: SK]

Non-Entrepreneurial Europeans

Edmund S. Phelps, 2006 Nobel Prize Laureate in economics, takes a stab at explaining Europe's lagging economic performance in this editorial in the Wall Street Journal.

He has some interesting things to say, albeit in bone-dry prose. He doesn't blame European social transfer payments for the lackluster performance (let us leave to one side, for the moment, how this performance is measured, and whether it's really all that lackluster). Rather, it's the mentality:

The values that might impact dynamism are of special interest here. Relatively few in the Big Three [France, Germany, Italy] report that they want jobs offering opportunities for achievement (42% in France and 54% in Italy, versus an average of 73% in Canada and the U.S.); chances for initiative in the job (38% in France and 47% in Italy, as against an average of 53% in Canada and the U.S.), and even interesting work (59% in France and Italy, versus an average of 71.5% in Canada and the U.K). Relatively few are keen on taking responsibility, or freedom (57% in Germany and 58% in France as against 61% in the U.S. and 65% in Canada), and relatively few are happy about taking orders (Italy 1.03, of a possible 3.0, and Germany 1.13, as against 1.34 in Canada and 1.47 in the U.S.).

***

The weakness of these values on the Continent is not the only impediment to a revival of dynamism there. There is the solidarist aim of protecting the "social partners"--communities and regions, business owners, organized labor and the professions--from disruptive market forces. There is also the consensualist aim of blocking business initiatives that lack the consent of the "stakeholders"--those, such as employees, customers and rival companies, thought to have a stake besides the owners. There is an intellectual current elevating community and society over individual engagement and personal growth, which springs from antimaterialist and egalitarian strains in Western culture. There is also the "scientism" that holds that state-directed research is the key to higher productivity. Equally, there is the tradition of hierarchical organization in Continental countries. Lastly, there a strain of anti-commercialism. "A German would rather say he had inherited his fortune than say he made it himself," the economist Hans-Werner Sinn once remarked to me.

***

It may be that the Continentals finding, over the 19th and early 20th century, that there was little opportunity or reward to exercise freedom and responsibility, learned not to care much about those values. Similarly, it may be that Americans, having assimilated large doses of freedom and initiative for generations, take those things for granted. That appears to be what Tocqueville thought: "The greater involvement of Americans in governing themselves, their relatively broad education and their wider equality of opportunity all encourage the emergence of the 'man of action' with the 'skill' to 'grasp the chance of the moment.'"

I don't know where Phelps is coming from ideologically, but -- as you can see by his prose -- he is an academic economist, not a polemicist. Therefore, I wouldn't call this Europe-bashing, despite the categorization.

Prepare to Die, Eurabians!

Wake up, Europe! You're on the edge of doom! In a couple of decades, your prancing fairy-men are going to be fighting Islamic insurgencies in burned-out cities and your women will be wearing veils.

Or so says the new book "America Alone: The End of the World as We Know It" by right-wing polemicist Mark Steyn. Steyn, perhaps best known for his fervent, nay unhinged advocacy of the triumphantly successful invasion of Iraq, has now written a book comparing the United States and Europe. It's been adoringly reviewed by right-wing commentator on Middle Eastern affairs Daniel Pipes, also a big fan of the invasion of Iraq (Pipes on the Iraq war in April 2006: "Oh, it was a success. We got rid of Saddam Hussein. Beyond that is icing."). Over to you, Daniel:

[Steyn] begins with the legacy of two totalitarianisms. Traumatized by the electoral appeal of fascism, post-World War II European states were constructed in a top-down manner, "so as to insulate almost entirely the political class from populist pressures." [Err, what is 'almost entirely' supposed to modify there? - ed.] As a result, the establishment has "come to regard the electorate as children." Second, the Soviet menace during the Cold War prompted American leaders, impatient with Europe's (and Canada's) weak responses, effectively to take over their defense. This benign and far-sighted policy led to victory by 1991, but it also had the unintended and less salutary side effect of freeing up Europe's funds to build a welfare state. This welfare state had several malign implications.