Here is my take on the famous German circumcision judgment. Thanks to the friendly folks at verfassungsblog.de for cross-posting this.
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The Cologne Landgericht decision proclaiming religious
circumcision to be a form of illegal assault will apparently soon be
superseded by legislation permitting the practice under certain
conditions. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the decision came about –
coupled with its endorsement by many members of the German criminal-law community and the fact that approximately half of Germans
want to see religious circumcision punished by law – points at a
continuing controversy. Circumcision also presents an interesting
cross-cultural case study, since it is not expressly regulated in either
the United States or (yet) in Germany. An enlightening 2002 analysis
by Geoffrey P. Miller shows that all U.S. published U.S. court cases
about male circumcision involve botched operations or problems with
obtaining parents’ consent. It appears that no U.S. court has yet
addressed a situation in which a doctor has been criminally prosecuted
for competently performing a circumcision with the consent of the
child’s guardians.
Even were such a case to emerge, it’s difficult to imagine a similar
outcome. Following the First Amendment’s explicit ban on ‘established’
churches, the Supreme Court has limited government interference in
private religious rituals. A line of Supreme Court cases has called for
the government to display a ‘wholesome neutrality’ toward all religions,
and to avoid unnecessary ‘entanglement’ of church and state.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has forbade American government entities
from pronouncing on internal church administration, drawing government administrative boundaries to accommodate religious sects, or banning controversial religious practices
under the pretext of public safety. This basic suspicion of
intermingling secular administration and religion is widespread among
legal officials. The average District Attorney, presented with a case in
which a third party complained about a properly-performed circumcision,
would almost certainly use her discretion not to prosecute.
The second (somewhat related) strand of jurisprudence emphasizes family autonomy. In a landmark 1972 case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,
the Court upheld the right of Old Order Amish families to withdraw
their children from formal education at the age of 16, observing that
though there is no explicit guarantee of family autonomy in the
Constitution, ‘the values of parental direction of the religious
upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society.’ The state, for example, may not ban
parents from sending their children to private religious schools or
even educating them at home, as long as curricular standards are
met. The fundamental Constitutional principle of American family law,
repeated in case after case, is to presume that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children”.
When parental autonomy is bound up with religious practice, the
rationale for judicial circumspection becomes even clearer.
And indeed, the decision of the Cologne court demonstrates the
problems that occur when courts intrude in this area. Considering its
worldwide resonance, the decision itself is astoundingly brief, just a
few paragraphs long. At one point, the court accuses the doctor (and, by
implication, the boy’s parents) of infringing the boy’s right to choose
his own religious affiliation. Yet the mere fact that a child is
circumcised doesn’t irrevocably commit him to Islam, as the 55% of American males who are circumcised
can attest. Second, the court can hardly have thought through its
proposed right for children to freely choose their religion. Both of
Germany’s established religions provide for elaborate public rituals in
which children are brought into their parents’ or community’s faith long
before they are of age to make binding legal commitments under German
law. Granted, these induction ceremonies don’t involve circumcision, but
the court did not bother to limit its principle only to these cases.
Like many legal commentators, the court also confidently proclaimed
circumcision to be against the child’s best interests without ever
suggesting why the child’s parents, who obviously had different views,
should be ignored.
These problems help explain the different reactions to the decision
among German and foreign observers. Christian Germans (whether devout or
nominal) are rarely circumcised. This is in stark contrast to the
United States, where routine circumcision was adopted during the late
19th century on hygiene grounds (including the prevention of
masturbation) which would now be considered dubious. Yet the practice
remains well-accepted: The American Pediatric Association recently concluded that
“scientific evidence demonstrates potential medical benefits of newborn
male circumcision” and explicitly noted that it is “legitimate for
parents to take into account cultural, religious, and ethnic traditions,
in addition to the medical factors, when making this decision.” By
contrast, circumcision in Germany has only been customary among two
religious minorities, one of which was decimated during the Third Reich,
and the other which only arrived in significant numbers in the last 40
years. The generally positive reaction to the decision among Germany’s
socially conservative legal culture shows a lasting undercurrent of
suspicion against customs and beliefs that have “non-European” roots –
and of the parents who wish to pass them on to their children.
Two Models of Freedom and Responsibility
Yet there is another factor driving the circumcision controversy: a
stronger emphasis on social cohesion. Again, the comparison with the
United States is instructive. America is, in many respects, an an
outlier in terms of governmentally-enforced social cohesion. There is no
national identity card in the United States, and some 10 per cent
of the population has no picture identification of any kind. American
rules regarding home schooling and religious education are among the
most liberal in the world. Unlike every other government in the world,
the American state is constitutionally debarred
from banning hate speech and propaganda in the name of social harmony.
Aside from wartime, compulsory military or civil service has never
existed in the United States. And, of course, the American social safety
net is designed only to provide transitional, time-limited aid. The
possibility that the devout might create self-perpetuating ‘parallel
societies’, a perennial source of anguish in the European media, is
largely absent from American public discourse. This is not because such
parallel societies do not exist in the USA – quite the contrary
is true – but because their existence is not seen as problematic as
long as they do not encourage crime or exploitation. (Of course, these
libertarian hallmarks coexist with a massive security sector and the
highest imprisonment rates in the world – but exploring this paradox is
beyond the scope of this post.)
Although the German political order also guarantees its citizens
wide-ranging civil freedoms, the approach is subtly different. In an
interesting article on the ‘German Idea of Freedom‘
Edward J. Eberle argues that Germany’s conception of individual liberty
— while robust and deeply-rooted — differs significantly from that
found in the United States. In contrast to the freewheeling American
conception of individual rights (accompanied by an equally unfettered
free market), the German conception of liberty ‘take[s] place within a
moral structure erected on ethical concepts that include human dignity
and its multiple radiations, people acting within the bounds of a social
community with its ensuing reciprocal obligations, and a Sozialstaat.’ Further, the discussion of rights in Germany is coupled with ‘duties rooted deeply in the culture and community’.
This conception of ‘freedom’ conditioned by social integration
(which, of course, prevails in many Continental European cultures)
enables the state to make claims on its citizens that would be
controversial in Anglo-Saxon countries. German court decisions, for
example, permit government officials to reject parents’ chosen names
for their children on a number of grounds, including that the name
might subject the child to ridicule or does not clearly indicate the
child’s gender. Until recently, military service was compulsory in
Germany, although many young men opted out under liberal
conscientious-objector laws. Germany also has a registration law, which
requires Germans to timely inform their government of any change in
address. Germany has comprehensive federal laws regulating everything
from the permissible size of huts on garden allotments to the content of vacation contracts, and a sizable contingent of ‘order police’ (the Ordnungsamt)
to enforce them. The German legal order does not provide for
untrammeled free speech – pro-Nazi rhetoric is illegal, and media which
publish insulting or privacy-intruding material may be confiscated and
their owners fined.
The flip side of this intrusion is an impressive network of social
rights and benefits. Despite recent reforms, German social welfare
benefits are still much more generous than their American counterparts —
but recipients may also required to submit to intrusive surveillance.
Germany has universal health insurance provided by subsidized insurance
companies which are run on the principle of ‘solidarity’. Germans
receive large welfare subsidies for having children, and enjoy some of
the most generous family leave policies in the world. Virtually all
higher education is provided free of charge (or for nominal tuition) by
government-funded universities. All workers are guaranteed several weeks
of paid vacation per year. Even welfare recipients can petition for
extra money to pay for a child’s wedding or a vacation.
To put it simply, the German social bargain permits the state to
intrude more deeply into citizens’ affairs in certain areas, in return
for providing them with an array of services designed to foster personal
development and socialize common life-risks. Germans face more subtle
pressure to conform to majority social norms, but in return enjoy
benefits conferred by that majority itself. This ideology of ‘duties
rooted deeply in the culture and community’ may have influenced the
German court’s reasoning: Instead of simply endorsing parental autonomy
tout court,
the judges asked whether the parents’ choice would bind their child
closer to the majority ‘culture and community’ of Germany. Because it
would not, it was that much easier to second-guess. Yet the reaction to
the court’s decision seems to mark a subtle shift in consensus-minded
Germany toward accommodating beliefs and rituals which will always
remain outside the mainstream.
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