George Packer has this analysis of Germany's participation in Afghanistan:
The country’s politicians refuse to call the war in Afghanistan a war. Germany’s participation was sold to the public here as peacekeeping and reconstruction, and that’s what it must remain to prevent any further erosion of support—even though it’s becoming more and more obvious that the war has come to the Germans in the north, the first real fighting the German army has seen since 1945. The German politicians and journalists I’ve spoken with want Germany to do more, not less, in Afghanistan, even if that means fighting. Public opinion in this amazingly pacifist country runs otherwise, though only the extreme left and right want an immediate withdrawal. This gap between élite and mass opinion is a dangerous one, since there’s so little attempt by German leaders to explain the country’s position in the war and why it might be necessary to do more than build roads and schools. A single mass-casualty blow against German forces in Afghanistan (or against a soft target here in Germany—the intelligence traffic has been unusually heavy recently) could significantly change the terms of this non-debate.
So far, reasonably persuasive. However, Packer continues:
Germans have a hard time accepting the narrow rationale for the war in Afghanistan, based on preventing another 9/11. For them, the reason to be in Afghanistan is to prevent a return to power of the Taliban and with it an enormous propaganda victory for Islamists all over the world. In other words, Obama’s turn away from Bush’s more ideological agenda and toward a narrow focus on national security is not necessarily persuasive here, in spite of the former’s huge popularity and the latter’s abysmal reputation. (How’s that for irony?)
Here, Packer should have continued to keep in mind the distinction he made in the first paragraph, between elite and public opinion. German elites (politicians, think-tankers, certain academics and experts) generally agree with the Taliban victory = Islamist victory argument, and it largely drives their continuing support of the war (which is not to say there isn't debate here as well).
The general public, as far as I can tell, simply does not care what happens in Afghanistan. They regard the fate of this dusty, tribal backwater on the other side of the world as having very little to do with their daily experience. They're generally on board with providing reconstruction and development aid, since that's a painless type of international engagement which fits in with the view Germans have of their role in the world. But as soon as large numbers of Germans soldiers begin returning in caskets, the government will have a very serious problem.
Packer speaks of government officials not doing enough to 'explain the country's position in the war,' but I don't think this really captures it. This is the oft-used German political concept of Vermittlung, roughly, bringing a message across in a convincing manner. Whenever German government officials feel the need to continue a policy of which the public disapproves, they will note the negative poll numbers, and then ruefully admit they haven't done a good enough job of Vermittlung.
But there's always another diagnosis of the problem lurking behind the scenes: the public has understood the message, and simply disagrees with it. I think that's where we are with Afghanistan. Plenty of senior German politicians have explained why 'our freedom must be defended in the Hindu Kush', but voters, by and large, did not buy it. German mainstream politicians have understood this, which is why they constantly emphasize the reconstruction aspects of the mission, which is the only remaining rationale that any significant number of voters agrees with. What Packer fails to grasp is that the German public cannot be convinced that it is a worthwhile use of their tax dollars and lives to engage in a protracted fighting war in some remote third-world country. Any attempt to justify the war in these terms is doomed to fail. Which is why German politicians rarely attempt it.
If there's a terrorist attack on German soil, this could change the dynamics in favor of the Afghanistan mission -- possibly. It's hard to analyze, and let's hope we never have to find out. But if there are large casualties in Afghanistan, what little support there is in Germany for a long-term, explicitly military mission in Afghanistan will collapse. This will, incidentally, be a boon for the Left Party, who have always been strident critics of the Afghanistan mission.
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